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Abstract. Globalisation has been accompanied by an equally global tendency towards devolution of 
authority and resources from nation-states to regions and localities that takes on various forms, 
depending upon which actors are driving the decentralisation efforts. The existence of a general trend 
towards devolution also has significant implications for efficiency, equity, and administration. The 
authors outline first the general drive towards devolution and then proceed to examine which 
countries are experiencing which forms of decentralisation. A theoretical argument emphasising the 
role of governmental legitimacy across various tiers of government is used to explain the diversity of 
devolution initiatives, drawing on examples that include Brazil, Mexico, India, China, the USA, 
and some European countries. Having supported their model of decentralisation, the authors then 
examine the implications of the widespread downward transfer of power towards regions. Some of the 
less widely discussed pitfalls of decentralisation are presented; caution in promoting devolutionary 





Research on globalisation has tended to stress the role global processes are playing in 
undermining the importance of nationally based policymaking, politics, culture, and 
society. Such trends are underpinned by the proliferation of communication and trans- 
portation media, the emergence of dominant forms of international, brand-based 
capitalism, and the standardisation of various modes of interaction, from the conver- 
gence of languages to digitisation (Dicken, 1998). Accordingly, globalisation tends to 
promote what Agnew (2000, page 101) has called a new international homogeneity 
across the global order. Such homogeneity implies a certain erosion of the importance 
of spatiality at the national, and by extension the regional, level as global processes 
succeed in diluting and internationalising the traditional `nexus of interactions' asso- 
ciated with local and regional spaces (Gray, 1998; see also Castells, 1996; Massey, 1999; 
Storper, 1997). 
 
Yet, in spite of this, globalisation is failing to obliterate the importance of the 
local dimension across the world. In many ways, recent developments point in an 
opposite direction: towards a greater relevance of place, space, and regions. The 
growing visibility of the local and regional dimension has many manifestations. 
Although some argue that the demise of the nation-state is continuing, the rise 
in regional political activism (Rodr|¨guez-Pose, 1998, pages 215f ), the increasing 
importance of regionalism in government (Keating, 1998), and the regionally based 
competition that mobile capital is inducing (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998) have given 
rise to a renewed interest in the role of regions. In this paper we will concentrate on 
one of the most significant recent developments at the global level: the widespread 
transfer of power downwards towards regions. This process, which in some cases 
involves the creation of new political entities and bodies at a subnational level and in others an increase in their 
content and power, is known as devolution 
(Prud'homme, 1994). 
 
There is now enough evidence to claim that since the outbreak of the process of 
globalisationöand perhaps as a result of itösubnational units have increased their 
demands for power. This process has numerous positive aspects but also raises impor- 
tant issues regarding national equity and welfare, public finance, and territorial 
competition. 
 
The focus of this paper is thus fourfold. First, in section 2, in response to the often 
simplistic conceptions of devolution, a theoretical model based upon Donahue's (1997, 
pages 7 ^ 15) threefold classification of the mechanisms of devolutionölegitimacy and 
the decentralisation of authority and of resourcesöis introduced. Subsequently, in 
section 3, we expose the devolutionary process in a selection of countries, including 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, the USA, and countries of the European Union. These 
represent a cross-section of some of the largest areas of the globe and cover the 
developed and the developing worlds. In section 4, different forms of devolution are 
compared and examined. In section 5 we critically assess the global implications of the 
devolutionary trend in light of its evident diversity. In the final section we conclude 
that a greater awareness of the benefits and drawbacks of devolution is required in 
order to prevent the escalation of some of the downsides associated with it (section 6). 
 
2 The theoretical framework 
 
Devolution is a complex and heterogeneous process. From the high level of decentral- 
isation of certain federal states, such as Germany, and of some Spanish regions, to the 
more limited power of regions in France or, until recently, Mexico, decentralisation 
processes across the world have taken on a variety of forms. Consequently, conceptual- 
isation of devolution is far from simple. Looking for a minimum common denominator, 
Donahue (1997, pages 7 ^ 15) characterises the process as being made up of three 
separate factors: legitimacy, the decentralisation of resources, and the decentralisation 
of authority. Any form of devolution implies some degree of subnational legitimacy 
and some form of decentralisation of authority and resources; consequently, any 
analysis of devolution should take these three factors into consideration. 
There is, however, a need for caution in examining evidence, because a simple 
list-based approach may overlook the interaction between the elements. The complex- 
ity of the devolution process derives from the interest conflicts of the actors involved 
and the differences in legitimacy that they share. Most importantly, the interests of 
subnational and national governments tend to be at odds across the component 
factors of devolution. Although national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, 
to devolve responsibilities (authority) to their regional or state governments with 
as few accompanying resources as possible, the subnational governments would 
prefer the opposite case. The balance between these extremes will depend upon the 
relative strength, or, in political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government.(2) 
In figure 1 we illustrate this approach. 
(1) Prud'homme's (1994) classification of decentralisation into spatial, market, and administrative 
decentralisation provides a useful conceptualisation. For the work in this paperöconcerned with 
administrative decentralisationöthe redistribution of decisionmaking to lower government tiers 
(deconcentration) and the closer involvement of semiautonomous organisations (delegation) hold 
less importance than the third type of administrative decentralisation that Prud'homme outlinesö 
that of power transfer to lower government tiers (devolution). As a consequence, throughout this 
text decentralisation will be taken to refer to devolution. 
(2) Donahue conceptualises legitimacy as incorporating `popular support' and `citizen cooperation'. 
He states that, ``ultimately the most important asset that government can command ... is not legal 
authority, or fiscal resources, or even talented personnel, but legitimacy'' (Donahue, 1997, page 12). 
 
 
If we begin at the bottom of the diagram, we can see that the legitimacy of subna- 
tional and national governments is determined for the most part by processes of history 
and political support. Regarding historical processes, culture, language, religion, and 
ethnicity have traditionally been the factors behind a strong regional identity and deter- 
mine the legitimacy of subnational claims (see Litvack et al, 1998, page 1). Economic 
development has also recently been added to the list (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 
2000; Keating, 1998). Regarding political support, the inclusion of legitimacy into the 
analysis brings into play a wealth of political factors that shape the power and room 
for manoeuvre of governmental tiers. An important caveat here, however, is that a 
reasonably effective political and democratic system must be in place to facilitate the 
influence of the electorate. This being the case, and all other things being equal, poor 
political support for the regional cause would translate into a relatively weak regional 
legitimacy and tend to promote a devolutionary process in which the central govern- 
ment holds the upper hand, favouring progressive decentralisation of responsibilities 
and often forcing regional and local governments ``to undertake increasing expenditure 
responsibilities on a static, and often narrowing, financial base'' (Bennett, 1997, 
page 330). In contrast, a strong regional legitimacy, underpinned by high political 
support for the regional lobby, would favour a more rapid decentralisation of resour- 
ces, as there would be strong demand for such transfers to subnational tiers 
of government. In general, the combination of historical and political factors in 
democratic countries shapes the legitimacy of governmental tiers, the relative strength 
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Figure 1. The complexity of devolution. Note: double-lined boxes and arrows indicate initial 
factors and processes, respectively; single-lined boxes and arrows indicate subsequent factors 
and processes, respectively. 
 
of their respective lobbies, and hence the forms that devolution initiatives are likely to 
assume. In nondemocratic systems, however, the influence of the electorate is compro- 
mised and other factors, which are less transparent, take on more importance in the 
determination of the legitimacy of government tiers. 
 
As depicted in figure 1 by the single-lined boxes and flows, the importance of 
legitimacy and popular support does not end at the initial stage. There is also an endo- 
genous role (if we assume again an operative political and democratic system). Following 
initial moves towards devolution, in terms of decentralisation of resources or authority, 
the popular perception of devolution will subsequently impact upon the legitimacy of the 
two government tiers. It is difficult to predict what direction this impact will assumeöit is 
just as feasible to envisage a popular approval or disapproval of decentralisation originat- 
ing from the centre, for example. Approval would mean a strengthening of central 
legitimacy and disapproval would lead to a relative reduction, which, in turn, could 
be translated into greater or lesser transfers of authority and/or resources from the 
centre to the regions. Although the political reaction to devolution is case-specific it 
nevertheless remains an important driver in the evolution of legitimacy between the two 
tiers, wherever a reasonable democracy has taken root. 
 
In general, an understanding of the interaction between legitimacy and the transfer 
of resources and authority is imperative to the examination of devolutionary trends 
(Donahue, 1997). A case that depicts strong decentralisation of resources displays no 
more evidence for devolution than one showing strong decentralisation of responsibili- 
ties. It merely indicates a different type of devolution, driven by different levels of 
government, and deriving, ultimately, from a different allocation of legitimacy across 
governmental tiers. Moreover, following from this, we should not necessarily expect 
cases to depict high levels of both resource and responsibility devolution, because forces 
often operate to promote their mutual exclusivity. It is with this conceptualisation in 
mind that we approach recent devolutionary efforts. 
 
3 The global trend towards devolution 
 
Before the onset of globalisation the world was dominated by strong national govern- 
ments, and regional governments tended to be either weak or nonexistent. Hence in 
Europe, with the exceptions of Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, as 
well as in Africa and Asia, central governments dominated throughout the postwar 
era. Latin American countries also had centralised states. Although some countries 
officially maintained federalist or regionalist constitutions, such as Brazil, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, they tended to be federalist on paper, with regions and states representing 
little more than administrative units. In the former Soviet Union (USSR) the situation 
was similar to that of Latin America. The USSR consisted of a union of sovereign 
states on paper, but, in reality, was heavily centralised and controlled from Moscow. 
Outside this framework, only the above-mentioned European countries, Australia, 
Canada, India, and the USA had systems in which the regional tier of government 
played any significant role, and even in some of these cases the role of regional 
governments had been waning. This was, for example, the case of the USA, where 
the power of the states had been declining with respect to those of the federal govern- 
ment since at least the reforms introduced by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great 
Depression (Donahue, 1997); it was also the case in India, where the centrally based 
mechanism of planned economic development undermined the power of the regions, as 
the central government dictated financial and economic goals to the states (Sury, 1998). 
At the beginning of the 21st century this panorama has radically changed. A 
devolutionary trend has swept the world. In some cases, subnational turbulence has 
led to the demise of former countries and to the emergence of new states. The fifteen 
constituent republics of the former Soviet Union have become independent states; 
Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia; four new states 
have emerged out of war-torn Yugoslavia, and Kosovo and Montenegro may follow 
suit. This phenomenon is not, however, exclusive to former Central and Eastern 
European socialist countries. Eritrea achieved independence after a long guerrilla 
war, and East Timor has recently become an independent state after twenty-five years 
of Indonesian occupation. 
 
The emergence of new independent states is an extreme form of a more general, 
global trend in the transference of power, authority, and resources to subnational levels 
of government. Few spaces around the world have remained untouched by this trend. 
Eight out of the fifteen members of the current European Unionöaccounting for 87% 
of its population (Rodr|¨guez-Pose, 2002, page 174)öhave seen some level of decentrali- 
sation. In addition to the already federalised Austria and Germany, Belgium became 
a federal state in the early 1990s, and Italy is in the process of federalisation. Spain, 
despite not being a federal state, is arguably the most decentralised state in Western 
Europe. France has taken limited steps towards regionalisationöwith ongoing debates 
over the granting of regional autonomy to Corsica. The United Kingdom and Portugal 
have also transferred a considerable amount of power to some of their regions. Similarly, 
Poland has recently followed the path towards regional devolution. 
 
Outside Europe, devolution has also been widespread, especially in large and 
heterogeneous states. In some cases, regional autonomy has been granted ex nihilo. 
This is the case for Indonesia, which passed autonomy laws aimed at undoing decades 
of extremely centralised government and at appeasing separatist tendencies in 1999 
(Aspinall and Berger, 2001). In China, although political devolution has not formally 
occurred and the Chinese Communist party still keeps a tight grip on political devel- 
opments, there has been widespread fiscal decentralisation that has provided regional 
and local governments with considerable powers and that has encouraged policy 
innovation at the regional level (Ma, 1996, page 5). 
 
In other cases, preexisting levels of regional autonomy have been enhanced. The 
most striking cases have been those of Latin American countries. In Mexico the 
collapse of the economic system in 1982 and the political uncertainty that followed 
led to extensive changes in territorial politics. Although Mexico's constitution has 
officially been one of federalism since at least the revolution of 1910 (Rodr|¨guez, 
1998, pages 236 ^ 238), extreme presidentialism and the dominance of the executive 
branch of government ensured seventy subsequent years of centralism and an enduring 
centralist culture (Rodr|¨guez, 1998, pages 235 ^ 236). But, asWard and Rodr|¨guez (1999, 
page 28) assert, the last two decades have seen a dramatic improvement in the political 
systems of representation, accountability, flexibility, and democracy and have led to a 
profound reform of territorial politics in support of greater federalism. 
 
In Brazil, the power of the states has been reinforced since the passing of the 1988 
Constitution. The `regional interest' lobby was extremely influential during the draft- 
ing process and was well placed to capitalise on the anti-central-government sentiment 
that had been developing during military rule (Coutinho, 1996, page 7). The regions 
were able to secure residual powers of legislation and maintain a lack of any clear 
constitutional demarcation of responsibilities between the state, the centre, and the 
local governments (Dillinger and Webb, 1999, pages 9 ^ 11). This has subsequently 
afforded them a hitherto unprecedented level of discretion over their own financing, 
administration, and responsibilities. 
 
Among states that had considerable regional autonomy before the onset of global- 
isation, the trend has also been towards even greater decentralisation. In India, the 
overconcentration of power in the hands of a few national elites until the early 1980s 
brought about a reaction that started to redress the balance from the centre to the 
regions (Sharma, 1999). In the USA, the trend towards centralisation, which some trace 
back to the American Civil War or to the Great Depression, started to be reverted 
during Nixon's presidency in the early 1970s (Donahue, 1997), but it was really under 
Reagan's New Federalism in the 1980s when states began to recover greater freedom of 
action. 
 
The global trend towards devolution is based on subnational legitimacy and implies 
greater transfers of authority and resources from the centre to the states or regions. In 
most cases, and as in previous waves of decentralisation, regional legitimacy has historic, 
linguistic, religious, and/or cultural roots. Regions and states with their own ethnic, 
historical, cultural, or linguistic identity have paved the way for decentralisation. That 
has been the case for Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, for Scotland in the 
United Kingdom, for Brittany and Corsica in France, and even for Chiapas in Mexico 
and for Tibet and Xinjiang in China, which have `brandished' ethnic, cultural, or 
historical arguments as the source of their demands for greater autonomy. Economic 
arguments are also increasingly becoming a source of subnational legitimacy (Keating, 
1998). Uneven regional economic development, alongside the achievement of greater 
economic efficiency through decentralisation, are coming to the fore and gradually 
starting to occupy the bulk of the regionalist discourse in favour of decentralisation. 
The Northern Italian Leagues were the first to base their devolutionary claims heavily 
on economic demands after their failure to gain visibility by highlighting traditional 
ethnic or linguistic issues (Diamanti, 1993). Nationalist and regionalist parties in Spain 
have increasingly resorted to similar arguments, as indeed have the Zapatistas in 
Chiapas. 
 
Additional factors also contribute to boost the legitimacy of calls for decentrali- 
sation. In some circumstances, decentralisation goes hand in hand with democracy. 
This is the case for Brazil and most of Latin America, where the advent of democracy 
and decentralisation are intrinsically related (Shah, 1991; Souza, 1997). Spain represents 
a similar case: forty years of dictatorship generated greater legitimacy for the devolu- 
tionary cause and contributed to the profound territorial transformation of the Spanish 
state after the return to democracy (Pe¨rez D|¨az, 1990). In other circumstances, decen- 
tralisation tends to accompany changes in the economic regimeöespecially moves 
towards the marketisation of national economies. This trend has been followed in 
India, China (Ping, 2000, page 180; Da-dao and Sit, 2001, page 29), and, to a lesser 
extent, in Mexico and Brazil, since the opening of these countries to trade. 
The process of devolution operates through transfers of authority and resources. 
Subnational governments across the globe currently enjoy greater authority and 
powers than they did a few decades ago. The trend is widespread. The powers of 
Italian regions have progressively increased since the late 1970s, and today they 
exercise considerable control in the fields of agriculture, tourism, regional planning, 
environment, and economic development (Rodr|¨guez-Pose, 2002). All Spanish 
regions now have competence for health and education, and some have also secured 
powers over policy areas such as policing, taxation, and fiscal affairs, which have 
traditionally been the prerogative of the nation-state (Castells, 2001). The Scottish 
Parliament enjoys tax-raising and law-making powers, and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Greater London Authority have 
taken over varying levels of central government activities (Tomaney, 2000; Tomaney 
and Ward, 2000). 
 
Outside Europe, a similar transfer has occurred. The USA has, for example, 
witnessed devolutionary efforts centred around two key areas: welfare and medical 
insurance (Schram and Soss, 1998). In Mexico, the transfer of power from the centre 
to the states includes: the increased ability of states to raise revenue; greater control for 
the states over development funds; a strengthened administrative capacity for the 
municipalities; and a clarification of the divisions of responsibility between different 
tiers of government (Rodr|¨guez, 1998, pages 251 ^ 252). In India, state responsibilities 
embrace public order, police, prisons, irrigation, agriculture and related activities, 
land, public health, industries other than those centrally assigned, and trade and 
commerce. In addition, states share with the central government authority over eco- 
nomic and social planning, education, labour, and forestry (Bagchi et al, 1992; RBI, 
2000). Chinese reforms since 1980 have been aimed at transferring to provinces greater 
responsibility for budgets (Ma, 1996, page 5). The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 
grants, as mentioned above, state governors all those powers not otherwise prohibited 
by the Constitution (Dillinger and Webb, 1999). 
 
Last, decentralisation has also implied a substantial transfer of resources from the 
centre to the regions. In figure 2 we illustrate the growth in subnational government 
expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure in our case-study coun- 
tries between 1982 and 1999. Readers should be aware of the limitations of these data 
from the International Monetary Fund as they do not convey the degree of local 
spending autonomy of subnational governments, do not distinguish between sources 
of tax and nontax revenues, intergovernmental grants, and other grants, and do not 
disclose what proportion of intergovernmental transfers are conditional or discretion- 
ary (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002, pages 6 ^ 7). However, given the lack of alternative, more 
detailed, and credible data sources, as well as the strength of the general trends 
identified here, these data must suffice for our purposes. Two points are apparent. 
First, in the group of countries as a whole, there is an average increase of around 
15% in the proportion of subnational government expenditures. Second, as the frame- 
work in figure 1 implies, not all countries are party to this trend. Some countries 
(that is, Brazil, China, and Spain) have witnessed a considerable decentralisation of 
resources, which, in the case of Brazil and China, has not been accompanied by similar 
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Figure 2. Subnational expenditure as a percentage of total Government expenditure. Note: in the 
case of Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and the USA, figures include local government expenditure as well 
as state or provincial expenditure (source: IMF, various years). 
 
levels of decentralisation of authority. In other cases, such as India, the decentralisation 
of authority has not been matched by a similar decentralisation of resources, as the 
share of central government expenditure increased slightly at the expense of that of 
regional government during the period of analysis. 
 
4 Differing forms of devolution 
 
Having established the existence of a widespread trend towards devolution in this 
section we address its diversity, with reference to the theoretical discussion in section 2. 
Recall we examined the interrelationship between the legitimacy of governmental tiers 
and the form of devolution we can expect to find in a given country. In general, all 
other things being equal, where subnational governments have enjoyed relatively strong 
legitimacy [as in the case of Spain (Rodr|¨guez-Pose, 1996)], devolution biased towards 
the decentralisation of resources can be expected; in contrast, where the central 
government has dominated [as in the case of the English regions (Jones, 2001; Morgan, 
2002, page 802)], greater decentralisation of responsibility may well ensue. In this 
section we present support for this contention by examining the cases of China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico, and the USA. 
 
China's efforts towards decentralisation began in conjunction with its marketisation 
initiatives in the late 1970s. The recognition that marketisation warranted a shift in 
government outlook, from a commanding role towards facilitating functions, brought 
about a series of fiscal reforms that saw the centre's influence over public resources 
reduced markedly across the 1980s (Ping, 2000, pages 180 ^ 181). By 1993 the provinces 
held control over revenue collection, with the centre's share in total revenue falling 
from 35.8% in 1983, to 22% in 1993 (Yi and Chusheng, 2001, page 86). In terms of 
figure 1, therefore, provincial legitimacy had soared to unprecedented levels, largely 
because of the enthusiastic nature of devolutionary initiatives. Furthermore, the impor- 
tance of the provinces was compounded by the introduction of negotiation-based fiscal 
contracting between the provinces and the centre at the end of the 1980s (Lee, 2000, 
pages 1009 ^ 1015), which allowed certain states, especially the richer ones, to exploit 
their bargaining positions to a far greater extent than under the previous formula- 
based revenue-sharing contracts. The impacts of this rise in the power of the provinces 
in relation to the centre soon became evident. Alongside the stated increase in subna- 
tional revenue claims, the provinces were able to extract far more aid from the centre 
than the centre itself could afford, contributing to the national deficit spiralling from 
parity to 600 billion yuan between 1985 and 1995 (Yi and Chusheng, 2001, page 90). 
Inevitably, this effect was skewed towards the richer provinces, whose bargaining posi- 
tions were stronger, and Ma (1996, pages 22 ^ 23) documents a dramatic decline in the 
progressivity of transfers from the centre to the regions between 1983 and 1991. Along- 
side this, as figure 2 illustrates, the central government's share in public expenditure fell 
steadily, from around 53% in 1982, to under 30% in 1998, hindering macroeconomic 
control and prompting emergency widespread fiscal reforms in 1994 (Bahl, 1999, pages 
105 ^ 129). Although these fiscal reforms succeeded in increasing the centre's involvement 
in revenue raising, Lee (2000, pages 1009 ^ 1015) documents the influence the provinces 
had in preserving their expenditure levels, undermining the centre's equilibrating efforts. 
But, although resources have been decentralised, many subnational governmental 
responsibilities, in accordance with the marketisation of China, have been discontin- 
ued, including large areas of responsibility over state-run enterprises. Overall, China's 
provinces can be seen to have increased their legitimacy markedly over the past twenty- 
five years, leading, as figure 1 would predict, to a surge in regional financing in excess 
of any accompanying devolution of responsibility. 
 
The 1988 Brazilian constitution was written in an environment of pronounced 
hostility towards central government control (Hagopian, 1996, pages 259 ^ 262 and 
268 ^ 269). Constitutional provisions to curb national party dominance resulted in a 
lack of consistent central politics, a persistent feature of the Brazilian system since the 
return to democracy. In 1990 the twenty-seven states were represented at the central 
level by eleven different parties (Kraemer, 1997, page 35), and in such a climate it 
comes as no surprise that state legitimacy and power have outweighed that of the 
centre. As Dillinger and Webb point out, ``even when the President seems to have 
strong political support on a roll call vote, that support is the result of extensive prior 
negotiations and concessions to regional interests'' (1999, page 11). The power of the 
states has been translated into unruly fiscal behaviour. States overspent massively 
during the late 1980s and 1990s, to the extent of printing their own money, borrowing 
from their own banks, and running up huge state-level debts (Dillinger and Webb, 1999, 
pages 23 ^ 25). Subsequently, the central government has serviced these debts and 
has faced little choice but to offer financial assistance to struggling states (Montero, 
2000, page 67). 
 
More recently, from the mid-1990s onwards, large debtor states have repeatedly 
threatened the central government with default (Dillinger and Webb, 1999, pages 25 ^ 26) 
and in January 1999 seven state governments declared themselves bankrupt, contribut- 
ing with their action to an economic crisis. Hence, state legitimacy can be viewed as so 
strong in Brazil that not only have devolution initiatives been biased towards resource 
devolution but also resource devolution has been paid for by the centre itself. Moreover, 
when individual fiscal packages with the states were eventually negotiated, beginning 
with Sa¬o Paulo in 1997, the lack of extra debt-servicing responsibilities for large debtor 
states confirmed that states had secured such a degree of legitimacy as to be able to 
promote resource-biased decentralisation yet avoid responsibility (Dillinger and Webb, 
1999, pages 25 ^ 26). Brazil therefore epitomises both the rapid decentralisation of 
resources and the gradual decentralisation of responsibility that we would expect, from 
figure 1, to proceed from high subnational governmental legitimacy. 
India presents a contrasting case. Here, the continued legislative and administrative 
dominance of the central government has engendered a very different decentralisation 
trajectory. Whereas the Chinese and Brazilian central governments yielded readily to 
the provinces and states, the Indian central government maintained its influence and 
managed devolutionary initiatives largely to its own advantage. Historically, although 
India is a highly decentralised country, the influence of the central government has 
been consistently high. Following British rule, which emphasised the centre as a means 
of coordination of export and political control, the regimented system of five-year 
economic plans has guaranteed the preservation of central legitimacy. So when, during 
the 1980s, fiscal imbalance began seriously to affect the national budget, with the 
internal debt of the central government rising from 15.9% of GDP in 1980/81, to 
33.6% in 1993/94 (Buiter and Patel, 1997, page 36), the temptation to exploit this 
legitimacy advantage and to decentralise responsibilities began to manifest itself. 
The Indian federal system is based upon three lists of responsibilitiesöaccruing to 
the centre, the centre and the states, and the states alone. The centre's progressive 
redefining of the contents of the state and joint lists has allowed the central government 
subtly to raise the responsibilities of Indian states over the past twenty years (see Bagchi 
et al, 1992; RBI, 2000). Simultaneously, aid to the states as a proportion of state 
expenditure has actually fallen, from 54.3% in 1990/91 to 50.6% in 1998/99 (ICSO, 
1999). To find that central expenditure as a proportion of total public expenditure has 
risen slightly over the period (as figure 2 illustrates) therefore comes as no surprise. As 
discussed in section 2, this fact should not be taken as evidence of centralisation but, 
as the preceding discussion confirms, a symptom of the form of devolution India has 
experienced, underpinned by central legitimacy and consequently dominated by the 
central government's agenda. 
 
Mexico and the USA represent intermediate cases. Political currents in Mexico 
have also had a decentralising effect. Through the presidencies of de la Madrid 
(1982 ^ 88), Salinas (1988 ^ 94), and Zedillo (1994 ^ 2000) the historical dominance of 
the centre has been progressively undermined. This is owed in large part to political 
developments that served to make the centre more accountable and at the same time 
providing regional politics and politicians with ever-increasing legitimacy. These devel- 
opments have taken various forms. The first set of changes took place in national 
politics. The incorporation in 1977 of 100 (out of 400) seats based on proportional 
representation, as opposed to the original, and remaining, first-past-the-post allocated 
seats, gave opposition parties some institutional voice at the central level (Ward and 
Rodr|¨guez, 1999, pages 23 ^ 27). In 1986 this representation was increased again as 
seats allocated on the basis of proportional representation swelled to account for 200 
of the 500 congressional seats. 
 
Regional politics provided opposition politicians with a second forum. The central 
government, suffering from a legitimacy deficit in the mid-1980s (Rodr|¨guez, 1998, 
page 241), took the first steps towards greater decentralisation, but, with time, the pro- 
cess led to a rise in state legitimacy. As one would predict from figure 1, devolution 
initiatives have graduated from emphasising the decentralisation of responsibilities to the 
states initially, towards a much more well-funded programme as states have risen in 
political terms and the fallibility of the centre has developed. Hence, under de la Madrid, 
although devolution initiatives emphasised the `autonomy' of regions and included many 
initiatives designed to give the states and municipalities of Mexico `greater freedom' 
over their own governance, these policies could be dismissed as either lip service or 
thinly veiled excuses to dump expenditure responsibilities on the states (Ward and 
Rodr|¨guez, 1999, pages 51 ^ 53). During Salinas's presidency further responsibilities 
were devolved to the states and localities, including comprehensive welfare duties. 
During this period the election of opposition governors began to shift the legitimacy 
balance in favour of the states. Finally, Zedillo's ascendancy to the presidency brought 
with it the renunciation of presidential metaconstitutional powers and the initiation of 
a cross-party forum on intergovernmental relations that has defined drives towards a 
new federalism in the country since 1996. The level of transparency and cogovernance 
these initiatives have achieved have guaranteed the states at least a reasonable accom- 
paniment of resources with each devolutionary effort (Ward and Rodr|¨guez, 1999). In 
general, then, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed an increase in devolution of 
resources alongside devolution of responsibility as a result of political changes that 
have acted to equalise the relative legitimacy of governmental tiers, in line with the 
mechanisms illustrated in figure 1. 
 
The case of the USA, in spite of significant political and economic differences, bears 
some similarities to the case of Mexico. As in Mexico, it was the centre, under the 
presidencies of Nixon and Reagan, that initiated drives towards devolution (Donahue, 
1997). Indeed, Nixon coined the phrase `New Federalism' in his bid to involve the states 
more closely in national governance. Popular disillusionment with the centre during the 
1970s and 1980s, following the Vietnam War, the oil crises, and a shift in ideological 
principles away from macroeconomic management, served as a convenient political 
platform from which to launch various responsibility-shifting policies. The 1990s, during 
Clinton's presidency, saw a continuation of this trend, with the introduction of block 
grants for welfare shifting much of the risk and decisionmaking capacity for social 
security to the states, but including only nominal, and potentially short-lived, increases 
in funding (Powers, 1999). Central legitimacy, therefore, had so far served to emphasise 
responsibility-biased devolution in the USA. 
 
As with Mexico, however, there have been forces operating to dilute this domi- 
nance, which have gained greater momentum over the past ten years.Whereas Mexico 
experienced an exogenous strengthening state-level legitimacy, driven by the political 
revolution, America's states have been able to bolster their own bargaining and negotiat- 
ing positions as a result of endogenous factorsöprecisely because their responsibilities 
and authority have increased throughout the reforms. The states have benefited from a 
positive popular perception of devolution, which has increasingly held the central 
government to account. As Donahue (1997, page 13) asserts, 
``Contemporary opinion surveys ... show dwindling faith in the federal government 
and (at least in relative terms) rising state legitimacy ... [T]he fraction of respon- 
dents identifying the federal government as `the level from which you feel you get 
least for your money' rose by 10 points (to 46%) between 1989 and 1994 alone.'' 
This rise in legitimacy of the states has acted to curb the emphasis on responsibility so 
prominent in previous devolutionary efforts. As an illustration, President Clinton's 
reluctance to devolve responsibilities for medical health, although trumpeted as a 
moralistic decision in order to safeguard equity, was prompted by widespread resis- 
tance from the states, whose fears over defective funding procedures stemmed from 
their experience of welfare reform (Offner, 1999). As regional and state-level politics 
continues to become more important in the USA, such checks and balances will act 
to equalise the devolution of responsibilities and resources. In the future, greater 
devolution of resources to the states may become a political necessity for the centre. 
 
5 The impacts of the devolutionary trend 
 
At this point we are able to draw two conclusions. First, as evidenced in section 3, the 
devolutionary trend is a common and general one. Second, however, this generality 
should not be mistaken for homogeneity. As we revealed in section 4, there are differ- 
ent forms of devolution that arise from different legitimacy distributions. In this 
section we reassess the implications of the trend in light of its virtual universality 
and complexity. 
 
From a strategic political perspective we should not be surprised to learn that 
awareness of the advantages of devolution tend to be more developed than awareness 
of its drawbacks.Whether devolution is driven mostly by national or subnational govern- 
ments, each potential driver has an inherent interest in defending its policies to the 
electorate and bolstering its legitimacy and popularity. The most common supporting 
arguments for devolutionary policies draw upon the efficiency advantages that lower level 
governance can engender (Donahue, 1997; Keating, 1999; Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 1996, pages 
297 ^ 300). Given that the population in any country has a diverse preference structure, 
which varies across geographical space, this efficiency has three major sources, the themes 
of which recur time and again (Litvack et al, 1998, page 5; Oates, 1972). First, a smaller 
democratic and financial base should result in a managerial reform that will lead to a 
heightened degree of accountability, bolstered by the reduced administrative distance 
between the electorate and the politicians (Bennett, 1990; Hatry, 1994). Second, the lack 
of diluting influencesöexperienced by central government having responsibility for 
alternative, diverse regionsötends to allow local governments the flexibility to respond 
to the preferences of their `customers' or electorates (Bennett, 1990). Third, the local 
nature of governance implies a greater chance of the election of local politicians with 
the specialist knowledge necessary to detect and react to the wishes of the electorate 
and defend its interests at higher levels (Putnam, 1993) as well as increasing the ability 
to implement policy innovations that would have been more difficult to pursue 
at the central or federal level (Bennett, 1990; Donahue, 1997). Devolutionists therefore 
acknowledge these three factors act both to ensure that local governments are 
more representative of and responsive to the interests of a given locality or region 
and to allow them to fulful this role. Thus, public policy in general is brought closer 
into line with the diverse preference sets of a nation, and welfare efficiency increases. 
Moreover, for those whose interests are not represented in their original location, 
there is in theory an increasing opportunity to choose and move between regional 
and local governmental systems as devolution progresses and as the diversity of 
public systems available to a nation as a whole increases. Arguments in favour 
of devolution are therefore underpinned by free-market assumptions, such as easy 
mobility, the politicoeconomic machinery of choice and democracy, and rational 
models of public sector behaviour under a democratic framework (see Tanzi, 1996, 
page 300). 
 
There are areas, however, where developments associated with the global decentral- 
ising trend we have identified above cast doubt on the picture of greater efficiency, 
greater democracy, and greater welfare painted by devolutionists. As Prud'homme 
(1994, pages 1.2 ^ 1.3) outlines, the enthusiasm for devolution is driven not only by a 
commonly ill-considered faith in economic arguments but also by considerations of 
strategy on the part of ruling elites, the often `fashionable' aura surrounding the 
concept of devolution, and the encouragement of international organisations, such as 
theWorld Bank, whose support for devolution is at best based upon a `weak analytical 
basis' (Prud'homme, 1995). Indeed, on such a basis, over 12% of all World Bank project 
activity in 1998 included a decentralisation component (Litvack et al, 1998, page 1). The 
need to expound the merits of caution with regard to devolution is therefore manifest. 
Consequently, in the following subsections, we explore some of the less encouraging 
developments associated with devolution by focusing on three aspectsöefficiency 
issues, equity issues, and administrative issues. 
 
5.1 Efficiency issues 
 
5.1.1 Devolution and debt 
As discussed in earlier sections, devolutionary initiatives in our case-study countries 
have often included some separation of responsibilities from resources. It is rare to find 
simultaneous decentralisation of responsibility and resources, as the driving actor 
behind devolutionary efforts will invariably have incentives to separate these two 
factors one way or another (Rodden, 2002a, page 684; also, see figure 1). Under these 
circumstances it is common to discover a mismatch between responsibilities and 
financing, which, as Bennett (1997, page 331) underlines, have inevitably led to the 
development of debts either at the central or at the local level, to a steady erosion of 
the linkage of local decisions to their financial consequences, and to growing tension 
between central governments and subnational administrations. The cases of India, 
Brazil, and Spain illustrate various ways in which devolution can encourage debt 
formation. 
 
In India, central government debt has been one of the major drivers behind 
devolutionary efforts. Between 1980/81 and 1993/94 the internal debt of the central 
government doubled, and total internal state debts rose from 4.6% to 7% of GDP 
(Buiter and Patel, 1997, page 36). It is easy, therefore, to envisage a situation where 
the pressure on central government finances at least contributed to a decentralisation 
of expenditure responsibilities. With a strong centre and calls for greater regional 
autonomy, the temptation to engineer favourable forms of devolution that will assist 
in limiting the central deficit may well become overwhelming. 
 
In cases where the states have played a key role in the decentralisation effort, the 
decentralisation of resources can contribute towards large central deficits and devel- 
oping regional debtsöthe former because of the de facto decentralisation of resources 
and the latter through the moral-hazard problem of central government effectively 
underwriting the expenditure of regions [for a general exposition of this commitment 
problem, see Rodden (2002a); for an examination of the Brazilian case, see Rodden 
(2002b)]. Perhaps the most apparent case of this type of development is found in Brazil. 
In Brazil, where decentralisation initiatives have been driven more by the states than 
by the centre, states were allowed to accumulate huge debts, often resulting from the 
development of short-term populist policies by Brazilian governors, aimed at securing 
their grip on power (Dillinger and Webb, 1999; Rodr|¨guez-Pose and Arbix, 2001). The 
generation of regional debts was traditionally perceived as a low-risk strategy by local 
politicians, because, first, the burden of the debt would fall on future generations and 
not on current voters and, second, states expected to be bailed out in the medium term 
by the federal government. This, in combination with a weak centre, the political 
survival of which during much of the second half of the 1990s depended on the support 
of regional politicians, created conditions where several Brazilian states defaulted on 
their debts (Rodden, 2002a, page 670). 
 
A devolutionary process driven by the so-called `historical' regions in Spain has led 
to the establishment of a system where, although in most regions regional finances are 
still largely based on central government grants, autonomous regions hold the upper 
hand (Rodr|¨guez-Pose, 1996). The consequence of this situation has been an erosion of 
national control over regional spending and a weak fiscal accountability, leading to a 
spiralling of regional debt across Spain (Castells, 2001; Montero, 2001). 
 
5.1.2 Inefficient competition for industry 
 
Another factor that threatens to proceed from efforts towards administrative devolu- 
tion concerns the phenomenon of territorial competition. The proliferation and greater 
powers of subnational governments are shifting the focus of development policies 
away from achieving greater equality or national cohesion, towards securing greater 
economic efficiency at the local level (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998). Consequently, there 
has been an increasing tendency for subnational governments to engage in competition 
for the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Scott, 1998; Vernon, 1998). When 
subnational governments offer incentives for mobile industry to locate within their 
region, and the private sector firm chooses between the most attractive packages offered 
by the states, the impact upon national efficiency can be damaging. Cheshire and 
Gordon (1996) conceptualise this situation in terms of a zero-sum gameöone in which 
the aggregate payoff of the game for all the actors involved is independent of the final 
outcome of the game across the actors. Specifically, the total gain of the arrival of a firm 
in a given country will be the same, or very similar, no matter where within the country 
the firm chooses to locate. But there are costs involved in trying to affect the locational 
decision of the firm that stem from the sort of measures offered to the mobile firmsö 
such as tax grants, incentives and subsidies, or specific policy arrangements for foreign 
investorsöthat contribute to the spiralling of subnational debt (Rodr|¨guez-Pose and 
Arbix, 2001). So, although the nation as a whole has nothing to gain as regions compete 
for investment it has much to lose as competition for mobile investment increases and 
regional advertising and marketing, government grants and loans, and interest and debt 
concessions increase. There are numerous examples of this sort of zero-sum competition 
for industry across Europe and the USA (Donahue, 1997; Mytelka, 2000; Phelps and 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2001) but it is perhaps in Brazil and China where the level of inefficiency 
associated with this sort of territorial competition is more apparent. 
 
Of all the industries in Brazil, the automobile industry represents the clearest 
illustration of a general tendency. The Brazilian automobile industry expanded rapidly 
during the relatively stable period between 1995 and 1999 at the start of President 
Cardoso's term in office. During that time, car manufacturers invested over US $12 
billion in Brazil (Rodr|¨guez-Pose and Arbix, 2001, page 134). Although this influx of 
FDI appears to be beneficial to the whole country, industrial mobility has created the 
conditions for fierce rivalry between Brazilian states hoping to attract investment and 
consequently it has paved the way for wasteful expenditure designed to influence 
companies' locational decisions. As has been pointed out elsewhere, ``Tax and bidding 
wars have become the norm in the motor industry'' (Rodr|¨guez-Pose and Arbix, 2001, 
page 145), with concessions routinely including the donation of land, the provision of 
infrastructure, state and local tax breaks, loans, and a series of financial cautions and 
guarantees. 
 
In China, a similar pattern of territorial competition has become commonplace. 
Under the marketisation drive of the 1980s provinces, along with thousands of counties 
and townships, launched their `opening up' programmes with the establishment of 
`zones'. These were of differing varieties but each shared the common theme of offering 
significant concessions to attract industry, including, as a typical example, a 15% flat 
rate on corporation tax, a two-year tax exemption on profits, and a further three-year 
50% tax reduction. Ma (1996, page 15) documents the nature of these zones, which, by 
mid-1993, had swelled in number to around 1800 across China. Crucially, there were no 
official standards in the level of concessions that could be offered by the zones. The 
lack of an official standard of concessions has led to the development of intense 
competition, with concessions often extended well beyond the example above, towards 
extremes such as five tax-free years and a further five years of 50% tax payment. 
The impact on China as a whole of the development of these zones may well have 
been detrimental, for the reasons Cheshire and Gordon (1996; 1998) provide. Ma 
(1996, page 15) points out that not only are concessions available to internationally 
footloose companies but also to indigenous companies in an attempt to attract them 
from one region to another. No discernible national economic gain from the resources 
expended on inducing these movements, which boil down to a simple spatial realloca- 
tion of industry within the nation, can be expected. Furthermore, McKenney (1993, 
pages 20 ^ 21) points out that in Beijing, one of the richer and more tax-effective areas 
in China, the ability of the subnational government to extract the taxes rightfully owed 
to them in their economic zones has been extremely poor. All in all, although much 
industry has been attracted to China through the use of economic zones, especially 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, the efficiency cost through competitive 
concession making across provinces detracts markedly from the advantages. 
 
5.2 Equity issues 
 
One of the traditional roles of national government is the redistribution of resources in 
order to safeguard minimum levels of welfare throughout the country. Decentralisation 
of authority and resources undermines a central government's ability to achieve this, in 
two fundamental ways. First, devolution of decisionmaking authority progressively 
transfers the responsibility for devising ways in which redistribution will occur to 
subnational government. Second, this tier of government is multifarious, and it is often 
the case that larger or more prosperous regions are overrepresented at this level. 
Hence, following devolution, a smaller role for national transfers and a larger voice 
for the regions in deciding how transfers are allocated is likely to result in a less 
progressive system of fiscal redistribution than would be the case under a centralist 
system (Thompson, 1989) unless an explicit and transparent interterritorial fiscal 
transfer system is established. The political and economic muscle of stronger regions is 
likely to skew public expenditure in their favour, regardless of whether the greatest 
legitimacy is based in the centre or in the regions and of whether the financing system 
of regions is based on local tax revenue or on grants from the centre.Where the finance 
system is locally based, the devolution of fiscal powers will inevitably favour wealthier 
areas, and where the finance system is centrally based the greater political muscle of 
larger and richer regions may be reflected in a greater capacity to secure transfers from 
the centre and to impede the evolution of a more centralised regional system of 
transfers or regional policy, as Markusen (1994) demonstrated in the US case. 
In figure 3 we illustrate the regressiveness of regional budgets in three of our case- 
study countries: Mexico, the USA, and Spain. The three cases represent three different 
forms of devolution and three different forms of regional financing, yet, in all cases, 
regions with the highest GDP per capita enjoy, as a general rule, a greater capacity for 
expenditure than do poorer regions. The positive regression lines in the graphs confirm 
this trend (figure 3). 
 
5.3 Institutional and political issues 
 
Three further issues concerning the understated downside of the devolutionary trend 
outlined in section 2 merit attention. First, and most obviously, devolution involves an 
increase in the number and a decrease in the size of administrative units, with accom- 
panying costs. Second, more subtly, lobbying costs under a decentralised system are 
likely to exceed those under a central system. In much the same way that regions 
compete for mobile capital, subnational governmental units also compete for central 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Figure 3. The regressiveness of regional budgets in 1999 in (a) Mexico, (b) the USA, and (c) Spain: 
expenditure per capital (average . 100) in relation to GDP per capita (average . 100). 
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financial assistance (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992), and, as for competitive bidding 
between regions, the expense incurred during the process of competition for govern- 
ment financing is a deadweight loss to the nation as a whole. Moreover, we can expect 
these losses to become greater as subnational governments become more powerful and 
complex. The proliferation of intragovernmental conventions and reviews of fiscal 
relationsöfor example, in Brazil (1989), China (1994), and Mexico (1995)öunderscore 
the importance, complexity, and expense associated with public redistribution. Third, 
devolution of authority carries with it the threat of increased corruption (Rodden, 
2002a, page 684). As Prud'homme (1994, pages 2.17 ^ 2.21) points out, although corrup- 
tion is hard to measure, several reasons can be given for suspecting corruption rates to 
be higher at local levels. On the one hand, more opportunities for corruption probably 
exist, along with greater pressure from interest groups resulting from their proximity to 
local decisionmakers. On the other hand, fewer obstacles exist to prevent corruption. 
Local officials typically enjoy more discretion over funds than do those at the national 
level as well as more long-standing and personal relationships with stakeholders, creat- 
ing the conditions for unethical relations that are promoted further by a relative lack of 
media scrutiny at lower governmental levels (Prud'homme, 1995). Furthermore, in 
Tanzi's (1996, page 301) view, contiguityöthe fact that officials and citizens live and 
work close to one another and have often known each other for some time and may 




The purpose of this paper has been to bring to attention the general trend in 
decentralisation and to outline the complexity of its forms and implications. To this 
end, some of the key issues surrounding the mechanisms of devolution were addressed 
and incorporated into an informal model at the start of the paper. In this model we 
identified three factors of decentralisation as composing the devolutionary trendö 
legitimacy, and the decentralisation of resources and authority. Some of the interest 
conflicts arising from the coexistence of these attributes of devolution were addressed 
in order to deepen our understanding of devolutionary mechanics. The relevance of 
this understanding became clear in section 3, in which we outlined the depth and 
breadth of the global trend towards devolution. In those countries with centralised 
systems twenty or thirty years ago, decentralisation has been widespread, and in those 
countries with initially more vertically dispersed government systems further decentral- 
isation from their respective starting points has become the norm. This global tendency 
towards the devolution of authority and resources elevates the importance of the need 
to understand this phenomenon. To this end, in section 4 the theoretical arguments 
given in section 2 were then applied to our group of case-study countries, exposing the 
diversity of devolutionary efforts across the globe. 
 
In section 5, given the understated heterogeneity of devolutionary processes, the 
parallel heterogeneity of devolutionary implications was addressed. The expectation 
that devolution leads to greater efficiency, as the devolutionists and many policymakers 
appear to hold, can be called into question on the grounds that the process tends 
to engender both debt and territorial competition which are harmful to national 
efficiency. The gains from devolution through the matching of public services to a 
heterogeneous population preference structure is a static argument that may overlook 
dynamic alterations in the behaviour of the actors involved. From either perspective, 
the incentive structure facing the national and subnational governments alter and 
present the potential for opportunistic interaction that is damaging for the economy 
as a whole. Although the matching argument remains strong it should be weighted 
against the expected losses resulting from these factors before any devolutionary 
processes are undertaken. 
 
In terms of equity, evidence was present to support the case that decentralisation 
of resources is often regressive from a territorial point of view. The combination of 
dwindling central government outlays in relative terms with the greater bargaining 
power of the richer and/or larger subnational authorities frequently leaves weaker 
and poorer regions in a worse financial state than under a centralised system. In 
section 5 we provided a brief discussion of the administrative, lobbying, and corruption 
costs that devolution is also likely to entail. 
 
In summary, it is imperative for policymakers to recognise varying forms of 
decentralisation and to be aware of the vested interests of national and subnational 
governments across these alternative devolutionary forms. It is also imperative that 
commentators, policymakers, and analysts remain aware of the context of debates and 
opinions surrounding devolution. It is no coincidence that devolution tends to be 
supported by national electorates, because powerful and influential actors seek to 
muster the support of the electorate to facilitate their own initiatives. At the same 
time, however, this situation might well be damaging if enthusiasm for devolution is 
not tempered with, first, an awareness of the context of any debates that occur and, 
second, an awareness of not just the benefits but also the understated drawbacks that 
devolution can engender. As Tanzi (1996, page 314) has emphasised, successful devolu- 
tion is highly dependent upon a long list of preexistent circumstances, the generation 
and, equally, consideration of which are by no means assured. The prescription of this 
paper is therefore cautionary with respect to both the interpretation and the promotion 
of devolutionary efforts. 
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